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A Case of the Philips Curve in the
Formation of a Monetary Union
A Glimpse at High Inflation Countries of the European
Monetary Union
By Yuet Wen Wan
I. INTRODUCTION
Anew initiative to further integrate theEuropean Union went into effect in November 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty.  With
this treaty eleven European Countries joined forces
to form the European Monetary Union (EMU).  The
EMU brings economic integration one step further by
creating a common currency for Europe - a monetary
union that would abolish the transaction costs of con-
verting one EC currency to another, as well as elimi-
nating exchange rate variabil-
ity and uncertainty among
traders and investors.
The eleven member
states are required to meet
several convergence criteria
prescribed in the Maastricht
Treaty, relating to inflation, in-
terest rates, government debt,
and exchange rate volatility.
High inflation countries such
as Italy and Ireland are working hard to force down
their inflation closer to the levels of the better per-
forming members, such as Germany.
This paper examines how disinflation in high
inflation economies affects unemployment levels.  Ac-
cording to classical macroeconomic theories, a down-
ward force on inflation will cause unemployment.  Due
to high inflation over the years among countries like
Italy and Ireland, their expected inflation rate is sig-
nificantly high.  As a result, when the government starts
a process of disinflation though fiscal and monetary
policies, economic activity declines, and there is a sig-
nificant short run increase in unemployment.
In opposition to the classical theories, con-
temporary views state that a country's commitment
and its announcement to join the Monetary Union
could create an effect that will lower the citizens' ex-
pectations of inflation levels.  If the monetary author-
ity is known for its reputation and credibility of policy
commitment, then inflation levels could be reduced
without the cost of significant unemployment.
The implication of possible short-term unem-
ployment is crucial.  High inflation countries may have
to bear the heavy cost of unemployment in order to
meet the convergence criteria.  The decision to join
the EMU might change if the
risk of significant increases in
unemployment exists, which
would have a severe impact
on the economy.  High unem-
ployment would lead to reces-
sion, which could subse-
quently cause failure of the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union.
Section II offers a historical
background of the EMU.
Section III examines the Theory of Optimum Cur-
rency Areas and the Philips Curve that relates infla-
tion to unemployment.  Section IV provides an em-
pirical model that looks at unemployment in the
economy of the EMU states.  Section V presents and
interprets the regression results. Section VI gives the
implications of the results on European Economies
and offers policy implications, and Section VII con-
cludes this paper.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In line with the European Union's objective
to create an economically integrated region that will
have common trade regulations, the European Mon-
etary System was established in 1979.  A subset of
“The decision to join the EMU
might change if the risk of sig-
nificant increases in unemploy-
ment exists, which would have a
severe impact on the economy.”
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Figure 1 : Relationship Between Inflation and Unemployment
countries established an adjustable pegged exchange
rate system through the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) where countries were to maintain their actual
exchange rate within a band of plus or minus 2.25
percent.  By the 1990s, several countries such as Italy,
Spain, Britain, and Portugal joined the ERM with bands
of 6 percent.  This fixed exchange rate system cre-
ated a discipline effect.  Germany was considered as
the lead in the system due its size and the reputation
of its central bank.  Because of this, countries be-
came disciplined by the fixed exchange rates to lower
their inflation similar to that of Germany (Pugel, Lindert,
2000).
Europe continued to strive for a more inte-
grated economy by dismantling barriers to trade and
removing capital controls by 1990.  These increased
movements of trade flows called for even more inte-
gration in terms of inflation rates and interest rates in
order to avoid speculative capital flight, creating what
political scientists call a 'spillover effect'  (Hughes,
1999).
This high degree of capital mobility created the need
for a single currency.  Thus, the Maastricht Treaty
was drafted in 1991 and became effective in No-
vember 1993.  This treaty called for the establish-
ment of the European Monetary Union where coun-
tries will use a single union-wide currency.  Countries
intending to join the Union must meet five criteria,
called the convergence criteria.  They are:
a. Inflation rate must be no higher than 1.5 percent-
age points above that of the 3 lowest inflation
countries,
b. Exchange rate must be within the ERM bands
without realignment for 2 preceding years of join-
ing,
c. Interest rates on government bonds must be no
higher than 2 percentage points above that of the
3 lowest inflation countries,
d. Budget deficit must be no larger than 3 percent
of its GDP, and
e. Gross government debt must be no larger than
60 percent of its GDP.
(Pugel, Lindert, 2000)
As mentioned earlier, this paper will focus on
the first criterion - restriction on inflation on rates.  The
following section will detail why the contractionary
policies to decrease inflation may create a problem
for the economy.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas helps
in explaining the rationale behind economic integra-
tion, but before examining that we need to under-
stand why disinflation causes unemployment.  The
Philips Curve is  the theory that best illustrates that
phenomenon.
Philips Curve
The Philips curve posits that the inflation rate
is dependent on expected inflation (pie), cyclical un-
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employment (u - un) and supply shocks (ε).  The
equation takes the following form:
pi = piε − β( u - un) + ε
Based on the assumption of adaptive expec-
tations, people form their expectations of inflation from
past or recently observed inflation.  Therefore piε can
be written as the previous year's inflation level, pi
−1.
This means that if a country is at the level of natural
unemployment and price levels have been rising
quickly, then it will be expected to continue rising be-
cause past inflation has influenced people's expecta-
tions on future inflation.  This implies that inflation is
inertial and inflation levels will remain high until some
event increases unemployment above natural unem-
ployment such as a recession or a supply shock
(Mankiw, 1997).
Cyclical unemployment is the deviation of un-
employment from the natural rate.  An increase in un-
employment other than the natural rate causes cycli-
cal unemployment to increase, and as a result the in-
flation rate is pulled downwards.  The term β deter-
mines the responsiveness of inflation level to the
change in cyclical unemployment.  Figure 1 shows
the relationship between inflation and unemployment
in terms of the Philips curve (Mankiw, 1997).
Therefore, in order to influence inflation lev-
els, the government can increase or decrease aggre-
gate demand (which will in turn result in changes in
the level of unemployment) through fiscal policies.  In
the Maastricht treaty, EU states with high inflation
were required to bring their inflation levels down to
the level of the three best performing EU states.  This
means that the government will have to impose some
kind of restrictive fiscal policy to fight the inertial in-
flation.  When that happens, aggregate demand falls,
and as a result the economy is faced with a recession
in the short run.
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
The Philips Curve tells us why inflation and
unemployment are inversely related, implying that the
convergence criteria may not be appropriate for some
EU countries. Now we need to evaluate whether the
European Union is suitable as a common currency
area (where exchange rates are fixed to the area's
currency).  In deciding the costs and benefits of join-
ing a fixed exchange rate system, The Theory of Op-
timum Currency Areas predicts that fixed exchange
rates are most appropriate for areas that are closely
integrated in terms of international trade and factor
movements (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997).
Developed by Robert Mundell in the 1960s,
this theory suggests that a high degree of economic
integration among countries will lead to higher mon-
etary efficiency gains when these countries fix their
exchange rates against the area's currency (Krugman,
Obtsfeld, 1997).  The key impediments to a success-
ful common currency area are the large differences
between countries, citizens' expectations on inflation,
and general interests.  To illustrate, Mundell uses a
simple model of two economically opposite entities
that are initially at full employment and balance of
payments equilibrium.  Mundell's argument lies on two
assumptions: 1) money wages and prices cannot be
reduced in the short run without causing unemploy-
ment (as predicted by the Philips Curve), and 2) mon-
etary authorities act to prevent inflation.  In the origi-
nal document written by Mundell in the American
Economic Review, he names the two entities A and B
and illustrates the effect of a shift in demand from the
goods of entity B to entity A:
Suppose first that the entities are countries
with national currencies.  The shift of demand from
B to A causes unemployment in B and inflationary
pressure in A. To the extent that prices are allowed
to rise in A the change in terms of trade will re-
lieve B of some of the burden of adjustment.  But
if A tightens credit restrictions to prevent prices
from rising all the burden of adjustment is thrust
onto country B; what is needed is a reduction in
B's real income and if this cannot be effected by a
change in the terms of trade-because B cannot
lower, and A will not raise, prices-it must be ac-
complished by a decline in B's output and employ-
ment.  The policy of surplus countries in restrain-
ing prices therefore imparts a recessive tendency
to the world economy on fixed exchange rates or
(more generally) to a currency area with many
separate currencies.  (Mundell, 1961)
Mundell then adds more assumptions into this model
by saying that the entities are now within a region of
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closed economy with a common currency and the
national government now pursues a full employment
policy.  He shows that the same shift in demand from
B to A causes not only unemployment and inflation in
the respective countries, but also a surplus in A's bal-
ance of payments.  Since the priority now is to main-
tain full employment, the central bank might increase
the money supply to correct the unemployment in B,
but that will only aggravate A's inflationary pressure.
Therefore, Mundell concludes that forming a com-
mon currency area cannot prevent both unemploy-
ment and inflation at the same time among its mem-
bers if they are not highly economically integrated
(Mundell, 1961).
A different representation of Mundell's model
by Grauwe takes on the same assumptions, but this
time he uses Germany and France as examples. Like
Mundell, Grauwe demonstrates that the shift in de-
mand causes unemployment in France and inflation-
ary pressure in Germany; but Grauwe argues that there
are two mechanisms that will bring back equilibrium
in the countries.  The two mechanisms are wage flex-
ibility and mobility of labor.  If there is sufficient free
movement of labor between European countries, then
an increase in unemployment in France will cause the
unemployed workers to look for jobs in Germany,
thus balancing out the disequilibrium, as long as wages
are flexible (Grauwe, 1994).
Unfortunately, labor does not move as freely
as we would like it to be among the EU regions.  Per-
haps the most apparent barrier to mobility of labor
among EU countries is the barrier of language and
culture.  An econometric study by Barry Eichengreen
of the University of California at Berkeley found that
regional unemployment rates are much similar in the
United States than the national unemployment rates
among EU members. This implies that there is some
magnitude of differences in the demand for labor and
wages among these EU states  (Krugman, Obtsfeld,
1997).
Another barrier to mobility of labor is caused
by government regulation.  As in many countries, the
government typically requires a potential employee
to obtain residency status before he or she is allowed
to work in the country.  Therefore it becomes harder
for unemployed workers in one country, to look for
employment in another (Krugman, Obtsfeld, 1997).
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical model utilizes the Philips curve
to construct a regression model to test its validity in
four high inflation countries in the EMU.  Data was
obtained from the International Financial Statistics Da-
tabase published by the International Monetary Fund.
Based on the Philips Curve, it can be hypothesized
that inflation and unemployment are inversely related.
Note that the Philips Curve takes the following form:
pi = pie − β( u − un) + ε Equation 1
This equation implies that actual inflation will equal
expected inflation if unemployment equals natural un-
employment.  This means that inflation is 100% iner-
tial and if all else is equal, people's expectations on
inflation, which will be based on last year's inflation,
will be a perfect predictor of actual inflation.  This
may or may not be the case.
Before moving on to formulate the empirical
model, two assumptions need to be applied: 1) past
inflation is used as a proxy for expected inflation, im-
plying an adaptive expectations model (therefore pie
= pi
−1), and 2) natural unemployment is fixed.  Next,
to illustrate that inflation is inertial but not 100% iner-
tial, the coefficient θ is assigned to pie as follows:
pi = θpi−1 − β( u - un) + ε Equation 2
In his explanation of the Philips Curve,
Mankiw posits that θ = 1, implying that actual infla-
tion is 100% inertial.  This means that prices are sticky
and people's expectation of this year's inflation is
heavily dependent on the level of previous year's in-
flation.  Therefore if θ is equal to or close to one,
there is little flexibility in prices and consequently
wages.  On the other hand, this modified Philips curve
model allows for θ to be some value so as to not
restrain it to the value one.
By manipulating with the terms in equation 2,
the following equation was obtained:  (The details of
this transformation can be found in Appendix 1)
u = un + 1/β(θpi−1 −  pi) + ε/β
OR
 u = un + θ/βpi−1 − 1/βpi + ε/β Equation 3
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where  u = unemployment
un = natural unemployment
pi
−1 = inflation lagged by one year
pi = inflation
ε = error term
Based on the relationship between unemploy-
ment and inflation observed in equation 3, a partially
complete regression model was formulated with un-
employment as the dependent variable.  This is merely
changing the terms in equation 3 into a form that can
be easily recognized as a regression model:
UNEMP = α + α1INFLAT_1 + α2INFLAT + ε
Equation 4
Where UNEMP = u
 INFLAT_1 = pi
−1
 INFLAT = pi
α = un
α1 = θ/β
α2 = 1/β
ε = ε/β
The following hypotheses were derived from
this:
1. Expected inflation (in this case, last year's infla-
tion is used as a proxy for expected inflation) is
positively related to this year's unemployment,
that is, α1 is expected to carry a positive sign.
The rationale behind this idea is that when busi-
ness people expect high inflation, they are likely
to lower costs.  One way to achieve lower cost
is by hiring fewer workers and this directly causes
higher unemployment.
2. Inflation is negatively related to unemployment,
that is, α2 is expected to carry a negative sign.
When the government tries to lower inflation
through contractionary fiscal policies, aggregate
demand decreases.  The resulting decreased in-
come level makes businesses poorer and they
end up hiring fewer workers.
This regression was run for data from four
high inflation countries, Finland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain.  Annual data from the year 1985 spanned across
at least 13 years and up to 15 years for each country,
depending on availability of data. Availability of data
based on years is summarized as follows:
Finland: 1985 -1999
Italy: 1985-1997
Portugal: 1985-1997
Spain 1985-1998
Since this regression required the usage of
cross-sectional and time series data, three dummy
variables representing Finland, Italy and Portugal were
added into the regression.  Spain was the omitted
variable.
UNEMP = α + α1INFLAT_1 + α2INFLAT +
α3FINLAND + α4ITALY + α5PORTUGAL + e
MODEL 1
These dummy country variables were meant
to pick up the effect of individual countries.  The co-
efficients attached to these dummy variables repre-
sent that country's level of natural rate of unemploy-
ment with respect to Spain's level of natural unem-
ployment.  Since Spain is the omitted variable, the
constant represents the predicted level of natural un-
employment for Spain.  To calculate un for Finland
for example, the coefficient for FINLAND (α3) will
be added to the constant (α).  Assuming that after the
regression was run, α=16.569 and α3=-11.063, then
Finland's un is equal to:
16.593 + (-11.063) = 5.53.
Thus, Finland's predicted level of natural unemploy-
ment is 5.53 percent.
It is also interesting to note that if this and the
previous years' inflation equal zero, this model pre-
dicts that unemployment will equal natural unemploy-
ment for the individual countries.
As we know, the Maastricht treaty was en-
acted in 1993.  At that time, countries intending to
join the union began decreasing inflation levels.  The
government's announcement to join the union may
have resulted in a change in the population's expecta-
tions on inflation.  This suggests the hypothesis that
there may be a structural change within the economy
that might cause inflation levels to have a different ef-
fect on unemployment from the year 1992 onwards.
From that, two new variables are created and added
into MODEL 1.  The first variable, D92, is a dummy
variable that equals 1 for data from the years 1992 to
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Table 1: Regression Results for Model 1
1997, and 0 for data from the years before 1992.
The second variable, called INFL_D92 is an interac-
tion between D92 and INFLAT.  These two vari-
ables produced the following equation for the second
regression model:
UNEMP = α + α1INFLAT_1 + α2INFLAT +
α3FINLAND + α4ITALY + α5PORTUGAL +
α6D92+ α6INFL_D92+ e
MODEL 2
By doing this, the model is controlling for a
change in the effect of inflation on unemployment for
the years after 1991.  What may be happening is that
before the Maastricht treaty, countries were experi-
encing a steady level of unemployment year after year.
Changes in inflation may not cause large shifts in un-
employment due to the fact that the population has
been expecting the high inflation levels and steady in-
crease in inflation year after year.  But after the
Maastricht treaty in 1993, the governments of high
inflation countries intending to join the EMU began
forcing down inflation levels and this might tighten the
economy.  This, according to the Philips Curve, would
result in an increase in unemployment.  By including
INFL_D92, the model is allowing a kink to take shape.
This will be much clearer when the results are pre-
sented.
V. REGRESSION RESULTS
MODEL 1
Results of regression from Model 1 are pre-
sented in Table1.  The coefficient INFLAT_1 was
only significant to the 0.05 level. INFLAT was signifi-
cant to the 0.005 level.  Both these coefficients have
the expected sign.  With this, we can infer that infla-
tion and unemployment is indeed inversely related.
Inserting the coefficients into the regression model,
the following equation was obtained:
UNEMP = 22.230 + 0.447INFLAT_1 -
0.913INFLAT - 10.9FINLAND - 8.655ITALY -
12.702PORTUGAL + e
 Equation 5
Comparing this to equation 3 (keep in mind
that INFLAT_1 = pi
-1- and INFLAT = pi), the values
for θ/β and 1/β were determined to be 0.447 and
0.913.  Subsequently, q can be calculated by dividing
θ/β by 1/β (0.447/0.913), giving a value of 0.49.  The
term b can also be calculated as the inverse of 1/β (1/
0.913) giving the value 1.0952.  A summary of the
values obtained for 1/β, θ/β, θ and β is presented in
Table 2.
The values obtained for β and θ were then
replaced into equation 3.  Bringing natural unemploy-
ment, un, over to the left hand side, the following equa-
tion is obtained:
u - un = 0.913(0.49pi-1 -  pi) + ε/β
Equation 6
This simple equation reveals a lot about the
effect of a fall in inflation on unemployment.  Contrary
to the generalized Philips Curve that Mankiw had pre-
sented, this equation says that θ ≠ 1.  Assuming no
supply shocks (therefore ε = 0), equation 6 calcu-
lates the deviation of unemployment from its natural
level (cyclical unemployment) based on the change in
inflation rate from the previous year.
Based on the equation above, Table 3, a table
that calculates the predicted cyclical unemployment
for Spain as the level of inflation falls, is created.  The
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EULAV
β/θ 744.0 ∝1
β/1 319.0 ∝2
θ 94.0 319.0/744.0
β 590.1 319.0/1
Table 2: Summary Of Values For 1/β, θ/β, θ And β
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02 02 0 32.22 6213.9- 4719.21
02 91 5- 32.22 6993.8- 4038.31
02 81 01- 32.22 6684.7- 4347.41
02 71 51- 32.22 6375.6- 4656.51
02 61 02- 32.22 6066.5- 4965.61
02 51 52- 32.22 6747.4- 4284.71
02 41 03- 32.22 6438.3- 4593.81
02 31 53- 32.22 6129.2- 4803.91
02 21 04- 32.22 6800.2- 4122.02
02 11 54- 32.22 6590.1- 4431.12
02 01 05- 32.22 6281.0- 4740.22
02 9 55- 32.22 4037.0 4069.22
02 8 06- 32.22 4346.1 4378.32
02 7 56- 32.22 4655.2 4687.42
02 6 07- 32.22 4964.3 4996.52
02 5 57- 32.22 4283.4 4216.62
02 4 08- 32.22 4592.5 4525.72
02 3 58- 32.22 4802.6 4834.82
02 2 09- 32.22 4121.7 4153.92
02 1 59- 32.22 4430.8 4462.03
02 0 001- 32.22 4749.8 4771.13
Table 3: Simulation Of Predicted Unemployment Based On Arbitrary Changes In Inflation
Levels
* for Spain, the predicted level of natural unemployment is 22.23, based on the results of MODEL1. Therefore, in order to
calculate unemployment for Spain, we add cyclical unemployment (u-un) values to the level of natural unemployment.
A Case of the Philips Curve in the Formation of a Monetary Union
The Park Place Economist / vol. IX 35
The Park Place Economist / vol. IX36
elbairaV detcepxE
ngiS
tneiciffeoC
)scitsitats-t( ecnacifingiS
TNATSNOC )466.11(456.61 000.
1_TALFNI + )494.1(262.0 241.
TALFNI - )111.0-(20-E441.3- 219.
DNALNIF ? )053.11-(980.11- 000.
YLATI ? )351.9-(643.8- 000.
LAGUTROP ? )322.31-(862.41- 000.
29D + )786.5(485.8 000.
29D_LFNI - )832.4-(971.1- 000.
Table 4: Regression Results For Model 2
Adjusted R2 = 0.845
previous year's inflation is assigned a hypothetical value
of 20%, and it is assumed that there are no supply
shocks.
Notice that the larger the fall in inflation, the
larger the predicted level of unemployment.  A small
decrease in inflation, say from 20% to19%, causes
13.83% unemployment.  On the other hand, a large
decrease in inflation causes a high level of unemploy-
ment.  For example, when inflation falls from 20% to
11%, unemployment is predicted to be much higher:
21.13%.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that
inflation is negatively related to unemployment.
MODEL 2
The coefficients and significance of each vari-
able are presented in Table 4.  All variables were
significant to the 0.001 level except INFLAT_1 and
INFLAT.  Both these variables lost its significance in
this model.  The coefficient of INFLAT is extremely
low (but still negative) and insignificant.  The loss in
significance may not be a bad thing because as men-
tioned earlier, unemployment levels were fairly steady
and might be unresponsive to changes in inflation in
the years before 1992.  Hence INFLAT_1 is also
insignificant.
The coefficient of INFL_D92 represents the
effect of inflation on unemployment from 1992 on-
wards.  This variable has a negative coefficient and is
very significant.  This means that after the introduc-
tion of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the model pre-
dicts that unemployment levels became very respon-
sive to changes in inflation.  This may be because the
population is not accustomed to the fall in inflation
levels.  From this, the model predicts that a kink oc-
curred in 1992 where unemployment became more
responsive to changes in inflation compared to the
years before 1992.  The individual country variables
represent the predicted level of natural unemployment
in these countries.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The findings in the regression results will aide
in formulating policy implications for the member states
of the European Monetary Union and other Euro-
pean countries that are intending join the Union.  Does
the cost of joining exceed the benefits?  Is it rational
for high inflation countries to join the Union?
This study found some evidence of negative
effects created by the Maastricht Treaty's first con-
vergence criterion.  One of the major conclusions of
this paper is that disinflation will inevitably create higher
unemployment levels.  As seen in the results of
MODEL 1, the larger the decrease in inflation level
within a single year, the larger the predicted unem-
ployment would be.  Therefore, in order to avoid the
high unemployment levels, the governments can plan
on a gradual decrease in inflation, instead of a rapid
decrease.  If steps are taken to create a gradual
disinflation process, people's expectations on infla-
tion would also decrease over time.  Higher unem-
ployment levels are certainly inevitable, but it will be
relatively lower than if the government tries to force
down inflation drastically in a very short time.
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An interesting topic for future research would
be to look at what will happen to predicted unem-
ployment when inflation levels decrease at a steady
rate over a period of several years instead of a dras-
tic decrease.  Is it costlier (in terms of unemployment)
to allow drastic disinflation now and at the same time
lower people's expectations on inflation, (thereby cre-
ating lower unemployment levels in the future)?  Or
will it be better to allow gradual disinflation and expe-
rience relatively lower unemployment over a period
of several years?
Further research can include controls for la-
bor mobility and wage flexibility as mentioned in the
theory section.  Other possible future research would
be to include the effects of other convergence criteria
such as the restriction on the level of budget deficit
and interest rates.
APPENDIX 1
From the Philips Curve equation,
pi = pie − β(u - un) + ε
the terms can be moved around as illustrated:
β(u - un) = pie − pi + ε
u - un = 1/β (pie − pi + ε)
u = un + 1/β(pie − pi) + ε/β
Natural unemployment, un , will assumed as fixed and
will therefore be the constant in the regression. ε/β
will be the error term in the regression.
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